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MEAT FOR THEM: IN SEARCH OF THE
DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NOT-SO-
ORDINARY CRIME OF PATRIMONICIDE
Ndiva Kofele-Kale*
ABSTRACT
Crimes against humanity are generally considered crimes of
such unimaginable horror that they shock the conscience of mankind.
The Article challenges the international community to take a mental
leap by recognizing that the contemporary version of official corruption
is so fundamentally different from its historical antecedents that it de-
serves to (a) be called a different name: indigenous spoliation or
patrimonicide; and (b), to be treated as an extraordinary crime that
rises up to the level of a crime against humanity. Towards this end, the
Article reviews the basic elements of a crime against humanity identi-
fied in various legal instruments, and in the law and practice of the
three United Nations' ad hoc criminal tribunals. On the basis of this
analysis, the Article then proceeds to demonstrate the link between the
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constituent elements of a crime against humanity and the new crime of
indigenous spoliation.
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, my research and writings have sought
to elevate indigenous spoliation or patrimonicide to the status of a
crime against humanity that entails individual criminal responsibil-
ity.' A recurring criticism of this formulation has been that the
phenomenon does not rise up to the level of jus cogens and therefore
lacks the gravitas of crimes that traditionally meet this test. Most re-
cently, in a keynote address delivered to a distinguished assemblage of
international law scholars and jurists from around the globe, 2 the
same criticism was raised. There is some reluctance to placing the spo-
liation of national wealth on the same moral plane as genocide,
slavery, slave trade, and so on. There is merit to this criticism. Crimes
against humanity are inhumane acts that attack, not just the individ-
ual, but, by their very nature, humanity itself. These are acts so grave,
on a scale so large, that their very execution diminishes the human
race as a whole. These are crimes that expose the barbaric depths to
which humanity can descend; they are crimes that evoke moral out-
rage; these crimes are of such unimaginable horror that they shock the
conscience of mankind. Comparing them to acts of indigenous spolia-
tion requires a mental leap that most people find hard to make. But to
the extent that the excessive and outrageous spoliation of the peoples'
wealth attacks and destroys the essential foundations of their society,
then it should arouse the same kind of revulsion as, say, the Rwanda
genocide or the depravity that symptomized the Cambodian "killing
fields".
It has been a little over sixty years since the Nuremberg trials
of major Nazi war criminals took place, but its impact on the progres-
sive development of international law continues to be felt. An African
1. I first used the term "patrimonicide" in a 1995 law review piece to describe the
illegal act of depredation committed for private ends by high ranking public officials. The
word was coined by combining the Latin words "patrimonium," meaning "[t]he estate or
property belonging by ancient right to an institution, corporation, or class; especially the
ancient estate or endowment of a church or religious body" and "cide," meaning killing. See
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous
Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 56-58 (1995).
2. This issue was discussed during the Q & A session following my presentation at the
22nd Annual Fulbright Symposium on International Legal Problems at Golden Gate
University School of Law, San Francisco, California, April 6, 2012. The symposium was co-
sponsored by the ABA Section on International Law and Practice and Golden Gate
University School of Law, Graduate Law Programs.
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proverb holds that only fools who send hyenas to roast meat for them. It
can be said that one of the Nuremberg goals was to ensure that when
someone is entrusted with the meat of others for barbecuing that he
will not appropriate it to satisfy his own cravings. But more impor-
tantly, such unbridled greed is beyond the pale of civilized behavior
and should not go unpunished. The affirmation of the principle that
individuals can be held criminally responsible under international law
remains one of the enduring legacies of Nuremberg. The second endur-
ing legacy is the Tribunal's recognition of a small category of crimes so
heinous that they shock the conscience of mankind.3 Finally, also be-
longing to this group is Nuremberg's rejection of the notion that States
should not concern themselves with human rights violations occurring
within the borders of another State.4
To combat the growing threat of indigenous spoliation, the in-
ternational community has engaged in a spate of international
legislation producing a number of regional and global anti-corruption
instruments. Despite these laudable initiatives, one senses some reluc-
tance on the part of international policy makers to accord indigenous
spoliation the status of a crime in positive international law in line
with the Nuremberg legacy. This reluctance can be attributed either to
a lack of will or a failure to focus the probing lights of international law
in the right places when searching for an effective antidote to this in-
sidious plague. This tendency to look at the wrong places for answers
reminds one of the fascinating anecdote about a wise man who chose to
search for the missing key to his wardrobe not in the bedroom, the
most likely place to have misplaced the key, because it was too dark
and he could not see. Rather, the sage chose to focus his search in the
courtyard- the least likely place to look for a misplaced wardrobe
key- where he could see better because of the sunlight! I believe the
search for the missing wardrobe key is an appropriate metaphor for
the misdirected energy expended in finding the solution to the problem
of indigenous spoliation or "grand corruption".
3. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d. Cir. 2010).
4. These are by no means the only parts (or principles) of the Nuremberg legacy but
only those that are of interest in this discussion. See notes 14, 19, 23-24 infra and
accompanying discussion.
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The current international anti-corruption regime5 has many
flaws6 not the least of which is the tendency to reduce official corrup-
tion to the ordinary, common-place offense of bribery, embezzlement,
misappropriation, fraudulent enrichment, or kleptocracy. This view of
corruption describes only one aspect of this multifaceted phenomenon,
that is, the raw act of taking. None of these terms, however, capture
the lethal effects of corruption on the socio-economic life of modern so-
ciety. It has been our contention that this modern version of corruption
is so fundamentally different from what has traditionally passed for
this activity that it is immune to the orthodox antidotes prescribed by
the current international anti-corruption regime.7 Because this concep-
tual framework has failed to incorporate the post-Nuremberg
developments in international criminal law, it is not surprising that
the solutions it prescribes do not go far enough in curing the problem.
It will be argued that the exceptional nature of modern corruption de-
mands a complete overhaul of traditional prescriptions and the
installation of novel and original solutions to combat this insidious
plague. Accomplishing this feat will require linking both its definition
and resolution to the aforementioned Nuremberg legacies such that a
high ranking public servant accused of committing acts of indigenous
spoliation should be relieved of any immunity stemming from his offi-
cial position; making available the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to
any State that seeks to assert jurisdiction over an accused without the
need to show that it has any connection to the crime whatsoever; al-
lowing for a liberal application of the rule of non-applicability of
statutory limitations to acts of indigenous spoliation; imposing stiff
criminal penalties including jail time for accused persons; and requir-
ing the restitution of stolen assets.
5. See, e.g., African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption;
(hereinafter "African Union Convention"); Inter-American Convention against Corruption,
concluded, 29 March 1996. (hereinafter Inter-American Convention"). Entered into force, 6
March 1997. OAS Off. Rc. OEA/Ser. K/XXXIV.1 CICOR/Docl4/96 Rev. 2 (1996); S. Treaty
Doc. 105-39; United Nations Convention against Corruption. (hereinafter "United Nations
Convention"). Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 31 October 2003. Entered into force,
14 December 2005. GA Res. 58/4 (Annex).
6. See generally Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an
Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under
International Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149-178 (Spring 2000).
7. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of
Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 56-58 (1995); see also Ndiva Kofele-
Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right:
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149-78
(2000).
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The goal of this Article is to establish the relationship between
the crime of patrimonicide and crimes against humanity as defined in
the International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("Draft Code") and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); and subse-
quently interpreted in the law and practice of the three United Nations
ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the ICC. It will
be argued that patrimonicide and crimes against humanity share the
same doctrinal genealogy and should be included among those interna-
tional law crimes that shock the conscience of mankind. This analysis
will be presented in four parts.
Part 1 briefly reviews the current international regime against
corruption to underscore the concerted effort by the community of na-
tions to rein in this scourge. It will be argued that this laudable
campaign to bring official corruption under some form of international
discipline has not posted any positive results in part because of a fun-
damental flaw in how the problem is framed, in particular how
corruption is defined. The reliance by the extant global anti-corruption
instruments on an outdated conceptualization of corruption ignores the
significant mutations this concept has undergone in the last fifty years.
The evidence is overwhelming that the modern version of corruption is
qualitatively different from its historical predecessor, which continues
to serve as a model for the contemporary global anti-corruption regime.
This flaw must be overcome in order to make room for the emergence of
a more effective and creative response that treats this global problem
as a crime under international law. Part II sets up the foundation for
this argument through its review of the basic elements of a crime
under positive international law while isolating the factors that distin-
guish crimes against humanity from common crimes. Part III will
examine the jurisprudence of various international ad hoc criminal
tribunals, specifically the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL with the goal of dis-
covering what has been identified as the key elements common to all
crimes against humanity. This review is necessary to confirm the the-
sis that acts of indigenous spoliation share the same doctrinal
foundations as classical crimes against humanity. The framework de-
veloped in Parts II and III is then applied in Part IV. The objective
here is twofold: first, to demonstrate the link between the constituent
elements of a crime against humanity and the new crime of indigenous
spoliation; and second, to then draw the inference that those involved
in the spoliation of national wealth should be held accountable under
5
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international criminal law as it has been shaped by the Nuremberg
legacy.
I. THE CURRENT GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIME
The first comprehensive regional convention against official cor-
ruption was the Inter-American Convention against Corruption
adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in March 19968.
This was followed in 1999 by the European Union Criminal Law Con-
vention against Corruption9 and its companion Civil Law Convention
against Corruption, then in 2002 by the African Union Convention for
Preventing and Combating Corruptiono, adopted by the Assembly of
the African Union. Two years later in 2004 the first global anti-corrup-
tion instrument, the United Nations Convention against Corruption,
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly."
A cursory review of the preambles of these anti-corruption con-
ventions capture the horror the international community attaches to
crime of corruption. In the preamble to the Inter-American Conven-
tion, the leaders of the OAS acknowledge that corruption undermines
the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order
and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples.
Further, they recognize that representative democracy an essential
condition for stability, peace and development of the region, requires
by its nature, the combating of every form of corruption in the perform-
ance of public functions, as well as acts of corruption specifically
related to such performance. Moreover, these leaders are persuaded
that fighting corruption strengthens democratic institutions and pre-
vents distortions in the economy, improprieties in public
administration, and damage to a society's moral fiber; they are con-
cerned by the fact that corruption is often a tool used by organized
crime for the accomplishment of its purposes; and, they recognize that
to combat corruption effectively requires coordinated action by
States. 12
Both the European Union Criminal Law Convention and the
Civil Law Convention like the Inter-American instrument underscore
the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the fight
8. Inter-American Convention, supra note 5.
9. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (hereinafter "EU Convention") adopted by
the European Union on Jan. 27, 1999 (Council of Eur.).
10. African Union Convention, supra note 5.
11. United Nations Convention, supra note 5.
12. Inter-American Convention, supra note 5.
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against corruption because corruption threatens the rule of law, de-
mocracy and human rights; undermines good governance, fairness and
social justice; endangers the stability of democratic institutions and
the moral foundations of society; distorts competition; hinders eco-
nomic development and endangers the proper and fair functioning of
market economies; and, has adverse financial consequences to individ-
uals, companies and States, as well as international institutions.
Much like their counterparts in the OAS, the heads of state and
government of the African Union also express their concern about the
negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic,
social, and cultural stability of African States and its devastating ef-
fects on the economic and social development of the African peoples.
They acknowledge also that corruption undermines accountability and
transparency in the management of public affairs, as well as socio-eco-
nomic development on the continent and stress the need to address the
root causes of corruption on the continent.' 3 Doing that imposes a need
to formulate and pursue, as a matter of priority, a common penal policy
aimed at protecting the society against corruption, including the adop-
tion of appropriate legislative and adequate preventive measures. The
preamble to the United Nations anti-corruption Convention expresses
the international community's concern about the seriousness of
problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security
of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, eth-
ical values and justice, and jeopardizing sustainable development and
the rule of law. The drafters call attention to the links between corrup-
tion and other forms of crime- in particular organized crime and
economic crime- including money-laundering, and cases of corruption
that involve vast quantities of assets, which may constitute a substan-
tial proportion of the resources of States and that threaten the political
stability and sustainable development of those States. The Convention
also acknowledges that corruption is no longer a local matter but a
transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies,
making international cooperation to prevent and control it essential1 4.
The current international anti-corruption regime represents a
major advance in the global war against official corruption. The vari-
ous treaties and conventions examined all start from the premise that
corruption is a criminal activity and those who engage in it must be
brought to account. Toward that end, they all treat corruption as an
extraditable offense on the basis of a bilateral extradition treaty be-
13. African Union Convention, supra note 5.
14. United Nations Convention, supra note 5.
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tween state parties or on the legal basis of the conventions themselves
when there is no extradition treaty between the state parties. Empha-
sis is placed on the need for mutual assistance and cooperation among
States, as an acknowledgment of the global reach of corruption. States
are encouraged to afford each other the widest measure of mutual as-
sistance by processing requests from authorities, investigating or
prosecuting the acts of corruption as defined in these instruments, ob-
taining evidence and taking other necessary action to facilitate legal
proceedings and measures regarding the investigation or prosecution
of acts of corruption. States are also encouraged to provide each other
with the widest measure of mutual technical cooperation on the most
effective ways and means of preventing, detecting, investigating, and
punishing acts of corruption.
It must be admitted that despite their promises, these anti-cor-
ruption instruments all fail to define official corruption as a crime
under positive international law, which engages the responsibility of
its authors qua individuals. None of the instruments stray from the
traditional definition of corruption with its narrow focus on bribery in-
volving public officials (either bribe-taking or bribe-giving).15 But even
then the definition of bribery embraced excludes that class of officials
who engage in outrageous acts of corruption outside the supply/de-
mand framework. 16 To make matters worse, not all the acts proscribed
in these conventions are made mandatory on the States' parties. Much
is left to each State Party that has not yet done so to enact domestic
15. Art. 15, UN Convention against Corruption defines corruption as: "(a) The
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage,
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or
acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official
himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties." See also Article VI of the Inter-American
Convention ("This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption: a. The
solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government official or a person who
performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift,
favor, promise or advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any
act or omission in the performance of his public functions; b. The offering or granting,
directly or indirectly, to a government official or a person who performs public functions, of
any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage
for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions; c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a
government official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose of illicitly
obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party"); and Article 4 of the African Union
Convention.
16. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual
and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International
Law, 34 INT'L LAW, 149, 157-161 (providing a critique of the cited approach) (2000).
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legislation criminalizing acts of corruption as defined in these instru-
ments.17 This is hardly an invitation to global consensus without which
the problem of indigenous spoliation will evade international control.
II. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION OF CRIMES UNDER POSITIVE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Characteristics of an International Crime
What factors distinguish a crime under international law from
an ordinary crime? Can indigenous spoliation meet the criteria that
have been generally identified as characterizing crimes under interna-
tional law? A good starting point for answers to these questions would
be the International Law Commission's (ILC) formulation of the Prin-
ciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal.18 In 1947
the General Assembly of the United Nations requested the ILC to pre-
pare a draft Code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded to the seven Nu-
17. See, e.g., Article 5 of the African Union Convention ("For the purposes set-forth in
Article 2 of this Convention, State Parties undertake to: 1. Adopt legislative and other
measures that are required to establish as offences, the acts mentioned in Article 4
paragraph 1 of the present Convention. 2. Strengthen national control measures to ensure
that the setting up and operations of foreign companies in the territory of a State Party
shall be subject to the respect of the national legislation in force. 3. Establish, maintain and
strengthen independent national anticorruption authorities or agencies. 4. Adopt legislative
and other measures to create, maintain and strengthen internal accounting, auditing and
follow-up systems, in particular, in the public income, custom and tax receipts, expenditures
and procedures for hiring, procurement and management of public goods and services. 5.
Adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption and
related offences, including protection of their identities. 6. Adopt measures that ensure
citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals. 7. Adopt
national legislative measures in order to punish those who make false and malicious reports
against innocent persons in corruption and related offences. 8. Adopt and strengthen
mechanisms for promoting the education of populations to respect the public good and
public interest, and awareness in the fight against corruption and related offences,
including school educational programmes and sensitization of the media, and the promotion
of an enabling environment for the respect of ethics."); see also Article 15 of the United
Nation Convention ([elach State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally");and
Article VI of the Inter-American Convention ("[tihe States Parties that have not yet done so
shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses
under their domestic law the acts of corruption described in Article VI(1) and to facilitate
cooperation among themselves pursuant to this Convention").
18. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Niurnberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950. Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 97.
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remberg principles.19 To fulfill this mission the ILC had to provide a
concise and comprehensive definition of the types of crimes which fall
within the scope of the Nuremberg Principles. Faced with a choice be-
tween a conceptual definition establishing the essential elements of
the concept of "crime against the peace and security of mankind" and a
definition by enumeration referring to a list of crimes defined individu-
ally in the draft code, the ILC opted for the former.
The Commission explains its preference for an enumerative def-
inition as a choice dictated by both theoretical and practical reasons:
[SIeveral members of the Commission expressed the fear that a con-
ceptual definition might lead to a wide and subjective
interpretation of the list of crimes against humanity, contrary to
the fundamental principle of criminal law that every offense must
be precisely characterized as to all its constituent elements. Any
danger of a characterization by analogy of a crime against the peace
and security of mankind should be avoided. On the other hand, if
this fundamental principle is observed and each crime against the
peace and security of mankind is carefully defined as to each of its
constituent elements, the practical value of a general definition
that would be the common denominator of these crimes becomes
doubtful. The enumeration of crimes in the present draft code could
be supplemented at any time by new instruments of the same legal
nature. 20
However, and as the Commentary makes clear, the enumerated
crimes do not cover exhaustively all crimes against the peace and se-
curity of mankind, but rather indicate the limited scope and
application of the Code. The drafters also decided to leave it to state
practice to define the exact contours for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. 21
The commentary to article 1 of the 1987 draft sets forth the
Commission's understanding of the specific characteristics of a crime
against the peace and security of mankind. The first of these is the
19. Although the ILC commenced its work in 1949, and submitted a Draft Code five
years later, the General Assembly did not take any action on the Code until the end of 1981
when it invited the ILC to resume its work. In 1991, the ILC provisionally adopted the draft
articles of the Code and transmitted them to governments for their observations. The
adoption of the 1991 Draft Code was, however, complicated by the process of adopting a
statute for a permanent criminal court, which the General Assembly had that same year
invited the ILC to consider. Thus, the 1991 Draft Code was referred back to the Drafting
Committee. Following this Committee's report, the ILC, at its forty-eighth session, held
from 6 May to 26 July 1996, adopted the text of a set of twenty draft articles constituting the
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (hereinafter '1996 Draft Code',
'Draft Code of Crimes' or 'Draft Code').
20. ILC YB 1987, vol. II (Part Two), p. 13, 1(4) of the commentary to article 1.
21. 1996 Draft Code, art. 1, T4.
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criterion of seriousness, which underscores the fact that these crimes
affect the very foundations of human society. As the commentary
points out, seriousness can be deduced in one of three ways: (a) from
the nature of the act in question (cruelty, monstrousness, barbarity,
etc.), (b) from the extent, the magnitude of its effects (massiveness, the
victims being peoples, populations or ethnic groups), or (c) from the
motive of the perpetrator (such as in the case of genocide). Seriousness
as understood in the Draft Code is a relative term to be measured
within a specific context taking into account the protected object. This
object, as the commentary explains, is the very foundation of human
society, which the Draft Code seeks to shield from grave attacks. In
addition to the seriousness of the act, there seemed to be agreement
that such acts must be large scale or systematic to qualify as crimes
against the peace and security of mankind. 22 These conceptual consid-
erations aside, there are five key elements that distinguish an
international law crime from an ordinary crime. These elements have
risen to the level of international customary law.
1. Individual Criminal Responsibility23
Article 1 of the Draft Code of Crimes, which sets out the scope
and application of the code, provides that it applies to those crimes set
out in Part II and that those crimes are punishable under international
law whether or not they are punishable under domestic law. The Com-
mentary to article 2 of the Draft Code of Crimes establishes the
principle of individual criminal responsibility for the commission of
crimes against the peace and security of mankind notes that this prin-
ciple is the enduring legacy of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment:
"[ilt was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions
of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals. . . In
the opinion of the Tribunal [this submission] must be rejected."24 That
22. The Draft Code that was finally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1996 draws a distinction between crimes against the peace and security of mankind, on
the one hand, and other crimes under general international law such as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, on the other. [1954] 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 150-52, U.N.
Doc. A/2673 [hereinafter 1954 Yearbook. For a critique of this approach, see generally Jean
Allain and John R. W. D. Jones, A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 8 EUROPEAN J. INT'L. L. 100
(1997).
23. The principle of individual responsibility for crimes under international law was
recognized in the Charter and the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal as Principle I: Any
person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible
thereof and liable to punishment.
24. Id.
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international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon States has long been recognized. The principle of individ-
ual responsibility and punishment for international crimes is widely
acknowledged as the cornerstone of international criminal law. It was
most recently reaffirmed in the Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (article 7, paragraph 1 and article
23, paragraph 1)25 and Rwanda (article 6, paragraph 1 and article 22,
paragraph 1)2 6 and implicitly in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. 27 The recognition of this principle has made it possible
to prosecute and punish individuals for serious violations of interna-
tional law.28
2. Punishment
Punishment is the other half of the doctrine of individual re-
sponsibility for crimes under international law. Punishment is
essential as a deterrent against violations of international law. The
Nuremberg Tribunal set the standard some sixty years ago by ac-
knowledging that "crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be en-
forced.29 Article 3 of the Draft Code of Crimes codifies this principle by
providing that "an individual who is responsible for a [crime under in-
ternational law] shall be liable to punishment. The punishment shall
be commensurate with the character and gravity of the crime." As a
universal crime, the penalty for acts of indigenous spoliation will de-
25. See Statute of the International Tribunal (For the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia) Annex to the Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(3 May 1993).
26. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 on Establishing an
International Tribunal For Rwanda (with annexed statute)Adopted 8 November 1994. S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 343rd mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), Art. 6, 1
and art. 22, 11.
27. Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. Entered into force, 1 July
2002. 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. Principle VI: The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law: (a) Crimes against peace [. . .1; (b) War crimes [. . .1; (c) Crimes against
humanity [... .1.
29. See Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
NAZi CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 53 (1947), available at http://
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdflNTNazi-opinion-judgment.pdf.
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pend on the jurisdiction, which in turn will determine the appropriate
penalty and the severity. So, for instance, if a State were exercising
jurisdictional competence over the accused, its national courts may de-
cide on the applicable penalty and "may or may not admit extenuating
or aggravating circumstances."3 0 On the other hand, if jurisdiction is
exercised by an international court, such as the newly-established In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), the applicable punishment will be
fixed by "an international convention, either in the statute of the inter-
national court or in another instrument if the statute of the
international court does not so provide."31
3. Head of State Immunity and Defense of "Obedience to
Superior Orders"
The Nuremberg precedent also established a number of other
important related principles aimed at ensuring individual accountabil-
ity for crimes under international law, such as the non-applicability of
statutes of limitations for such crimes, the supremacy of international
law over domestic law,3 2 the exclusion of the official position of an indi-
vidual, including a Head of State or other high-level official, or the
mere existence of superior orders, as valid grounds for relieving an in-
dividual of responsibility for such crimes.33 These principles were
incorporated into the Draft Code, as the autonomy of international law
in the criminal characterization of the kinds of behavior which consti-
tute crimes against the peace and security of mankind is expressed in
the concluding paragraph of article 1 of the Code "crimes under inter-
national law [are] . . . punishable as such whether or not they are
punishable under national law;"3 4 the non-applicability of the defense
of "obedience of superior orders" (save as mitigation of sentence) and
the non-applicability of immunities up to and including heads of state
30. See Articles of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
[1996] 2, pt. 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter 1996 Yearbook Part 2].
31. Id.
32. Principle II: The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the
act from responsibility under international law.
33. Principle III: The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n, 2d Sess., June 5-July 29, 1950, 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316; GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
12 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Report].
34. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Int'l Law
Comm'n, 48th Sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.522 (1996) [hereinafter
Draft Code].
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who commit a crime against the peace and security of mankind are
covered, respectively, in articles 5 and 7 of the Code.35
4. Universal Jurisdiction: Duty to Prosecute or Extradite
Nuremberg also recognized that certain crimes under positive
international law should be treated as crimes of universal concern,36
understood as the worst crimes which affect the foundations of human
society. These crimes have attained jus cogens status37 imposing an
obligatio erga omnes38on all States towards the international commu-
nity as a whole. As a consequence, any State may fulfill that obligation
by exercising universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of commit-
ting such crimes, even though the prohibited acts were not committed
35. Id. at 2-3.
36. Principle II, supra note 27. See also Ndiva Kofele Kale, Economic Crimes and
International Justice: Elevating Corruption to the Status of a Crime in Positive
International Law, CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (June 25, 2009),
http://www.chrda.org/articles4.html "An essential characteristic of universal crimes is that
a state may participate in their repression even though they were not committed in its
territory, were not committed by one of its nationals, or were not otherwise within its
jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce. A crime of universal interest, that is, a crime under
international law, can be characterized as such irrespective of its designation under
domestic law. This is what is meant by the principle of the supremacy of international law
over national law; reaffirmed in the Draft Code of Crimes in Article 1. Additionally, crimes
of universal interest must come with adequate safeguards to protect the rights of the
accused, for instance, the prohibition against double jeopardy (non bis in idem) and non-
retroactivity. The former protects an individual accused of committing an international
crime from being prosecuted or punished more than once for the same act or the same crime.
It guards against multiple trials conducted in different national courts for the same offense.
Where the principle of non bis in idem seeks to safeguard the accused from capricious
judicial treatment from the criminal justice process, the doctrine of retroactivity seeks to
uphold the fundamental objectives of criminal law which is to prohibit, to punish and to
deter conduct which is considered sufficiently serious in nature to justify characterizing it a
crime. Satisfying this principle requires that the standard of conduct that differentiates
between permissible and prohibited conduct be defined a priori. The Commentary to the
Draft Code of Crimes makes the point that the prosecution and punishment of an individual
for an act or omission that was not prohibited when the individual decided to act or to
refrain from acting would be manifestly unjust. This provision is without prejudice to the
prosecution and punishment of an accused for a crime under pre-existing national law,
provided the national law in question is applied in conformity with international law. ."
Ndiva Kofele Kale, Economic Crimes and International Justice: Elevating Corruption to the
Status of a Crime in Positive International Law, CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (June 25, 2009), http://www.chrda.org/articles4.html.
37. These peremptory norms of general international law are non-derogable and
cannot be modified or revoked by treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
38. For a brief but excellent discussion of these concepts, see M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63, 63-74 (1996).
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in its territory, were not committed by one of its nationals, or were not
otherwise within its jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce. 39 An obliga-
tio erga omnes also confers on any State a duty to prosecute or
extradite under the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 40
5. Non-applicability of Statutory of Limitations
Statutory limitations are not mentioned in the Nuremberg
Principles, and the Draft Code of Crimes is silent on the matter.41
39. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, art. I, Aug. 8, 1945.
40. See Draft Code, supra note 34, at art. 9. As far back as 1971, the General Assembly
urged all states "to take measures in accordance with international law to put an end to and
prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity and to ensure the punishment of all
persons guilty of such crimes, including their extradition to those countries where they have
committed such crimes." G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2840 (Dec. 18, 1971). The
General Assembly also affirmed that "refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest,
extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and to generally recognized norms of international law." Id. Two years later in 1973 the
United Nations General Assembly declared that "crimes against humanity, wherever they
are committed, shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is
evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and,
if found guilty, to punishment." G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. AIRES/3074 (Dec. 3,
1973).
41. Actually article 5 of the 1987 draft and article 7 of the 1991 version of the Draft
Code states that "[nlo statutory limitation shall apply to crimes against the peace and
security of mankind." Text of the Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the Commission on
First Reading, [1991] 2, pt. 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1
(Part 2) [hereinafter 1991 Yearbook Part 2]; Draft Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and Commentaries thereto, Provisionally
Adopted by the Commission at its thirty-ninth session, [19871 2, pt. 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 15,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1/ (Part 2) [hereinafter 1987 Yearbook Part 2]. However,
this language was omitted from the 1996 Draft Code out of concern that the non-
applicability of statutory limitations was a principle which could be applied only to the 'core
crimes' (such as genocide and crimes against humanity) but not all international crimes."
See Bruce Broomhall, Statutory Limitations, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANiTY (Dinah L. Shelton, ed., 2005). This flip flopping can be blamed on two
factors that influenced the Commission's thinking: first, the fact that, in internal law,
statutory limitations for crimes is neither a general rule nor an absolute. Furthermore, as
the Commission noted in the Commentary to article 5 of the 1987 draft, the rule of
prescription is recognized in certain systems of law but not in others (e.g. the Anglo-
American). In the French criminal code, for instance, the rule of prescription does not apply
to serious military offenses or to offenses against the security of the French state. A second
reason for the lukewarm attitude toward statutory limitation is the absence of doctrinal
consensus on the nature or scope of the rule, especially on the question whether it is a rule
of substantive or procedural law. 1987 Yearbook Part 2 supra. The Commission was equally
influenced by a lacuna in international law relating to crimes against the peace and security
of mankind which took no account of statutory limitations for crimes. Id. For instance, the
1945 London Agreement establishing the International Military Tribunal made no mention
of this rule neither did the St. James Declaration nor the Moscow Declaration. Id.
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However, consistent with the evolution of international law and in a
bid to address the concern that statutes of limitations might forever
block the possibility of holding the perpetrators of World War II crimes
accountable, 42 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Con-
vention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations on War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in 1968.43The Convention's pre-
amble expresses the conviction that the potential application of
statutory limitation to these crimes is "a matter of serious concern to
world public opinion" and their effective punishment "is an important
element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms . . . and the promotion of interna-
tional peace and security."44 Article 1 declares that "[nio statutory
limitation shall apply [to these crimes] . .. irrespective of the date of
their commission."45
Article 4 provides that States ratifying the Convention "under-
take to adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes, any legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that
statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and
punishment of crimes referred to. . . and that, where they exist, such
limitations shall be abolished."46 The principle of prescription was
eventually included in the Rome Statute which declares in its article
29 that "crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject
to any statutes of limitations."4 7 In the view of one commentator, given
the clear wording of this article "any statutory limitations in national
law will have no bearing on the ICC's investigation and prosecution of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes . . .. States that
ratify the Rome Statute are obliged to cooperate with the Court, in-
cluding the arrest and transfer of suspects sought by it... regardless of
whether a statutory limitation has expired under national law."4 8 Arti-
cle 29 of the Rome Statute confirms the emergence of a customary
42. According to one publicist "[t]he high-profile trials at Nuremberg and subsequent
proceedings following World War II did not lead to the widespread prosecution that some
sought of the many suspected Nazi and other war criminals who lived either openly or in
hiding around the world." See Broomhall, supra note 32.
43. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), annex,23 U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp.
No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218, at 40 (Nov. 26, (1968) [hereinafter Non-Applicability].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 41.
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 29, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
48. Bruce Broomhall, Statutory Limitations, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/topics/
statutory-limitations (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
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international law norm on the non-applicability of statute of limita-
tions to crimes against humanity among other core crimes under
international law.4 9
B. The Distinguishing Features of a Crime Against Humanity
1. Early Attempts at Defining Crimes against Humanity
Although the five factors enumerated above are common to all
crimes under international law, however, among the core group of seri-
ous crimes of concern to the international community (aggression,
genocide, apartheid, etc.), crimes against humanity are treated differ-
ently. The definition of crimes against humanity usually consists of
identifying a list of inhumane acts such as murder, rape, torture, de-
portation, and so on. However, the definition does not usually attempt
to distinguish between murder, kidnapping, and rape that form part of
crimes against humanity from everyday murders, rapes, and kidnap-
pings. There is, therefore, need to first identify the essential
characteristics of a crime against humanity, i.e., the specific features
that distinguish crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes. Three
comments are in order.
First, as Dixon and Hall observe in their commentary on article
7 of the Rome Statute, "there has been little agreement for nearly a cen-
tury on what are the internationalizing factors that distinguish crimes
against humanity from ordinary crimes, such as murder, kidnapping,
assault, rape and false imprisonment."50 Early attempts at defining
crimes under international law, focused more on identifying jurisdic-
tional thresholds only and not internationalizing factors distinguishing
crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes.5 1 Second, the Nurem-
berg Principles re-introduced the concept of crimes against humanity
but without providing a clear and concise definition other than that
they consist of a small group of crimes of exceptional gravity that en-
gage individual responsibility. 52 The Nuremberg Principles defined
crimes punishable as crimes against humanity certain acts, when such
acts are done or such persecutions are carried on "in execution of or in
49. See Rome Statute, supra note 47.
50. Rodney Dixon & Christopher K. Hall, Crimes Against Humanity, COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 168, 170 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
Beck/Hart 2d ed. 2008).
51. Id.
52. Principle VI: The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law: (a) Crimes against peace [. . .1; (b) War crimes [. . .1; (c) Crimes against
humanity [. . .1. Nuremberg Report supra note 33, at 13.
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connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime".5 3 The link to
crimes against peace or war crimes as part of the definition of crimes
against humanity was dropped in subsequent attempts by the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) to define the scope of this crime. 54
Third, the may have unwittingly contributed to this definitional
morass. In incorporating the Nuremberg Principles into the Draft
Code, the ILC did two things that may have held back the emergence of
a consensus around the elements of a crime against humanity. First, it
chose not to draw up a draft article specifying the particular character-
istics of crimes against humanity. Second, it maintained an artificial
distinction between crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. They were not accorded the same doctrinal parent-
age as result the constituent elements that defined each of these
crimes were different. However, in the 1987 draft code the Commission
identified two of the essential features that an act or activity must ful-
fill in order to qualify as a crime against the peace and security of
mankind: first, the seriousness of the crime, and second, the scale. Be-
cause the Commission treated crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity as different in kind, if not substance, it chose
not to draw up a draft article specifying the particular characteristics
of crimes against humanity. This choice may have contributed to the
lack of consensus around the elements that constitute a crime against
humanity. However, in the 1991 draft code, the Commission dropped
its long standing distinction between crimes against peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity, opening the door for the application of
the same constituent elements in that separate these crimes from
other crimes.
Two years later in its Seventh Report on the Draft Code, the
ILC, through its Rapporteur, introduced three factors that it thought
53. Id.
54. See Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Int'l Law
Comm'n, 6th Sess., June 30- July 28, 1954, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/85 (Apr. 30, 1954). . The
decision to drop this link to other crimes was in order "to make the punishment of the acts
enumerated in the paragraph independent of whether or not they are committed in
connection with other offenses defined in the draft Code. On the other hand, in order not to
characterize any inhuman act committed by a private individual as an international crime,
it was found necessary to provide that such an act constitutes an international crime only if
committed by the private individual at the instigation or with the toleration of the
authorities of a State." See also S.C. Res. 808, 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res./808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
("crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited
regardless whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in
character."). U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 13 U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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distinguished crimes against humanity from common crimes:55 first,
the particular infamy and horror that characterizes the crime5 6; sec-
ond, committed on discriminatory grounds "[t]he thing that
distinguishes inhuman acts from common crimes is motive. They are
acts that are promoted by ideological, political, racial, religious or cul-
tural intolerance and strike at a person's innermost being, e.g., his
convictions, beliefs or dignity;" third, the mass or systematic nature of
the crimes.57 In the 1991 Draft Code, the ILC introduced the concept of
systematic or mass violations to replace the terms "inhuman acts" and
"persecutions" found in article 21 of the 1954 Draft Code. The Com-
mentary to article 21 of the 1991 draft notes that the common factor in
all the acts constituting crimes against humanity are, first, a serious
violation of certain fundamental human rights; second, the systematic
nature or scale of the act. The former relates to a constant practice or
to a methodical plan to carry out such violations while the latter, i.e.,
the mass scale element, relates to the number of people affected by
such violations or the entity that has been affected. The drafters
wanted it understood that either of these elements-systematic or
mass scale-in the definition of a crime against humanity is enough to
trigger the offense. However, the emphasis on the systematic nature of
the act is intended to exclude isolated acts, which are not systematic or
on a mass scale, "no matter how reprehensible." 58
The concept of "systematic or mass" violations is retained in the
final version of the Draft Code adopted in 1996.59 Article 18 of this
version lists a total of eleven inhumane acts as constituting crimes
against humanity. These are: murder; extermination; torture; enslave-
ment, persecution; institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or
religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights
and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the
population; arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; ar-
bitrary imprisonment; forced disappearance of persons; rape, enforced
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; and other inhumane acts
which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human
55. Doudou Thiam, Seventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, [1989] 2, pt. 1 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 and Add. 1
[hereinafter 1989 Yearbook Part 1].
56. Id. at 87.
57. Id. at 88.
58. 1991 Yearbook Part 2 supra note 41, at 103.
59. But the crime of "systematic or mass violations of human rights" is replaced with
"crimes against humanity." See Draft Code supra note 34, at art. 18.
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dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm. These crimes are
now codified in numerous international instruments. 6061626364
The commentary to article 18 recognizes "two general condi-
tions which must be met for a prohibited activity to qualify as a crime
against humanity within the meaning of that provision. The first con-
dition consists of two alternative requirements. The first alternative
requires that the inhumane acts be 'committed in a systematic manner'
60. The Rome Statute specifies that ". . any of the following acts when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or
forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; j) The crime of
apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Rome Statute, supra
note 38, at art. 7.
61. See also The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 5 which describes: ". . .the following crimes when committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population:(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds; (i) other inhumane acts;"." ICTY Statute, supra note 54.
62. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Article 3
holds ... .the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:(a)
Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture;
(g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; Ci) Other inhumane
acts." S.C. Res. 955, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
63. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Article 2 holds ". . .the
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population: a. Murder; b. Extermination; c. Enslavement; d. Deportation; e. Imprisonment;
f. Torture; g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other
form of sexual violence; h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; i.
Other inhumane acts." Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-U.N.,
Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
64. The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), Article 5 prohibits ". . .any acts committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical,
racial or religious grounds, such as: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation;
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; other
inhumane acts." Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the
period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-U.N., June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
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meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy."6 5 "The second al-
ternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed 'on a large
scale' meaning that the acts be directed against a multiplicity of vic-
tims. This requirement excludes an isolated inhumane act committed
by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative." The term "large scale" is
preferred over "mass scale", a term which appeared in an earlier text of
the draft code, because it is sufficiently broad to cover various situa-
tions involving a multiplicity of victims. 66
The second condition, which must be met before a prohibited act
rises to the level of a crime against humanity, requires that the act was
'instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or
group.' This alternative is intended to exclude the situation in which
an individual commits an inhumane act while acting on his own initia-
tive, pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any
encouragement or directed from either a Government or group or or-
ganization. 67 This hair splitting continued for a while with the
inclusion in the UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council
that led to the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia language to the effect that crimes against hu-
manity are "inhumane acts of a very serious nature. . . committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian popula-
tion on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."6 8
However, after a long history of repeatedly changing views, there now
appears to be an emerging consensus of some of the internationalizing
components of the definition of crimes against humanity which distin-
guish these crimes from ordinary crimes that may be committed (1) as
part of (2) a widespread or systematic (3) attack (4) against any civilian
population and, possibly, (5) with knowledge of the attack.69 The fol-
lowing section examines these requirements in the context of the case
law of international criminal tribunals.
65. Articles of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
[1996] 2, pt. 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part.2)
[hereinafter 1996 Yearbook Part 2].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. ICTY Statute supra note 54.
69. Dixon & Hall supra note 41.
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III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. Legal Instruments Share Common Ground
The legal instruments establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY Statute")70 the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR Statute")71 and the
Special Court of Sierra Leone ("SCSL Statute")72, all define a crime
against humanity as consisting of a category of egregious acts73 com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population. In sharp contrast to the SCSL and ICTR Statutes,
the ICTY Statute much like the Rome Statute, limits the commission
of this set of crimes during armed conflict. In its definition of a crime
against humanity, the Rwanda Statute adds the additional require-
ment that the attack against a civilian population must be motivated
by "national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."74
The Statutes for the three ad hoc tribunals share a common list
of crimes that constitute crimes against humanity which include mur-
der, extermination; enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, any other
form of sexual violence, persecution on political, racial, ethnic, or relig-
ious grounds, and other inhumane acts.75 The three Statutes are also
agreed on the key elements which must be proved to show the commis-
sion of a crime against humanity. These are 1) an attack; 2) that is
widespread or systematic; 3) directed against any civilian population;
4) the acts of the accused must be part of the attack; and 5) the accused
knew or had reason to know that his or her acts constitute part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population.76
70. ICTY Statute supra note 54.
71. ICTR Statute supra note 60.
72. SCSL Statute supra note 60.
73. See supra note 54.
74. Compare SCSL Statute supra note 60 (eliminating need for armed conflict) and
ICTR Statute supra note 60 (eliminating need for armed conflict) with ICTY Statute supra
note 54 (requiring armed conflict); Rome Statute supra note 47 (requiring armed conflict).
75. SCSL Statute supra note 60; ICTR Statute supra note 60; ICTY Statute supra note
54.
76. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Trial Judgment, 1 110 (May 28,
2008) [hereinafter Fofana Trial Judgment].
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1. There must be an Attack
The first element in the commission of a crime against human-
ity is the existence of an attack understood as "an unlawful act, event,
or series of events of the kinds" listed in the crimes against humanity
article.77 The jurisprudence of the ICTY has tried to clarify the "armed
attack" element in the definition of a crime that constitutes a crime
against humanity contained in the ICTY Statute.7 8 In a number of
cases, the ICTY has indicated that an attack in the context of a crime
against humanity is not limited to the use of armed force but may also
include any "mistreatment of the civilian population" such as murder,
torture, beatings, rape, plunder, looting, and destruction of property
directed against civilians.7 9 The actions of the defendants in Fofana
were found to amount to mistreatment of an untold number of civilians
during the civil war in Sierra Leone. As part of their campaign to ter-
rorize the civilian population in a number of villages, Samuel Norman
and the other leaders of the Civil Defense Force (CDF)80 engaged in
looting, destruction of private as well as business property, infliction of
serious bodily harm and serious physical suffering on civilians, and the
extorting of money from them as well.8 '
The distinction between an attack and an armed conflict "re-
flects the position in customary international law that crimes against
humanity may be committed in peace time and independent of an
armed conflict."8 2 As the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kunarac pointed out,
the requirement of an armed attack83 "is a purely jurisdictional prereq-
77. Prosecution v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Trial Judgment, $298 (June
17, 2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment].
78. ICTY Statute, supra note 49, at art. 5.
79. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Appeals Judgment, para. 86 (Feb. 22,
2001) [hereinafter Kunarac Appeals Judgment], Prosecutor v. Brianin, Case No. IT-99-36-
T, 131 (Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Brbanin Trial Judgment].
80. The CDF, comprising of variously tribally-based hunters , was one of the organized
armed factions in the Sierra Leone civil war that fought against the combined forces of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).
81. Prosecutor v. Norman and ors, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on motions for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 98 1 56 (Oct. 21, 2005). [hereinafter Norman and
ors].
82. Prosecution v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, 77 (Mar. 2, 2009)
[hereinafter Sesay Trial Judgment].
83. An example of an armed attack within the meaning of article 5 of the ICTY Statute
was the conflict between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Bosnian Croat forces supported by the Government of Croatia as well as that between the
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the Bosnian Serb forces. Based on the above, the Trial Chamber concluded that there
was an armed conflict. See Tadia? Trial Judgment, 566.
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uisite" which is satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict and
that objectively the acts of the accused are linked geographically as
well as temporally with the armed conflict. 84 The "armed conflict" re-
quirement is distinct from the "attack" requirement, and under
customary international law, "the attack could precede, outlast, or con-
tinue during the armed conflict, but it need not be a part of it."85
In a similar vein, both the Rwanda tribunal and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone have also tried to clarify the doctrinal confusion
in the distinction between an "attack" and an "armed attack." For the
latter court "[a]n attack constitutes a course of conduct involving the
commission of acts, and need not be a military attack."8 6 In Prosecutor
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR acknowledged that "[cirimes
against humanity can be committed inside or outside the context of an
armed conflict." 7 In Kayishema thousands of unarmed men, women
and children from various locations who sought refuge in "The Com-
plex", which was the Home St. Jean Complex located in Kibuye town,
were massacred on orders by the defendant, Kayishema. Even though
there was no armed conflict in the Kibuye Prefecture,88 the defendant
was found guilty of crimes against humanity. While it is generally un-
derstood that an armed conflict exists "whenever there is a resort to
armed force between states or protracted armed violence between gov-
ernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a state,"89 this clearly was not the case in Kibuye.
It can be inferred from the case law of these tribunals that the
attack element is not per se a distinguishing characteristic of a crime
against humanity. Rather, it is an element shared with ordinary
crimes in that there must be a commission of acts that constitute the
commission of a crime. For example, while analyzing the legal ele-
ments of murder as a crime against humanity and murder as a war
crime, the SCSL in the Fofana case held that both charges share the
required element of "the death of one or more persons."90 The death of
one or more persons is equivalent to the attack element necessary for
the crime of murder and regardless of whether the defendants are
84. Id. at 413.
85. Prosecution v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A. Appeals Judgment, 251 (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadic Appeals Judgment].
86. Norman and ors., supra note 81.
87. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 127 (May 21,
1999) [hereinafter Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment].
88. Id.
89. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Trial Judgment, 412 (Feb. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Kunarac Trial Judgment].
90. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at T 143, 146.
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charged with murder as a violation of the Geneva Convention on war
crimes or murder as a crime against humanity, a murder must have
occurred.
2. The Attack must be Widespread or Systematic
There has been some debate on the proper construction of the
"widespread or systematic" attack requirement. It has been urged on
some tribunals, as the defense did in the Bla~kix case,9 1 that the
phrase can only be read to mean "widespread and systematic." The
Trial Chamber, on the other hand, appeared to have been persuaded by
the prosecution's argument that that the two characteristics "wide-
spread in nature" or "systematic in nature" of the element of
"widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population" were
not cumulative. 92 The term "widespread" has been interpreted by the
various Tribunals to refer to both the scale of the acts and the quantum
of victims involved. The concept of "widespread" also refers to the geo-
graphical scope of the events or activities. In the Fofana case, the
SCSL Trial Chamber found that the events surrounding the conflict in
question constituted "part of a widespread attack" due to the "broad
geographical area over which these attacks occurred."93 The evidence
demonstrated that several towns and villages were attacked. 94 In Pros-
ecutor v. Bagosora, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that the fact that
the accused ordered and had knowledge of attacks against civilians
who were singled out and killed at roadblocks and various sites be-
cause of their ethnicity and political leanings demonstrated that the
attacks were widespread and systematic.95
The "systematic" face of the Janus-like "widespread and sys-
tematic" requirement refers to the framework within which the crimes
were committed, more precisely "the organized nature of the acts of
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence." 96 The pres-
ence of a plan can be inferred from the factual circumstances. The
ICTY Appeals Chamber has identified a number of factors to consider
when determining whether an attack is indeed widespread or system-
atic because it revolves around a pre-determined plan. These factors
91. Prosecutor v. Blagkim, Case No. IT-95-14-T, (March 3, 2000) [hereinafter Blagkie
Trial Judgment]]].].
92. Id. at 190.
93. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 56, at 691-92.
94. Id. at 691.
95. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Trial Judgment, 1 2165 (Dec. 18,
2008) [hereinafter Bagosora Trial Judgment].
96. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, at [ 94.
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include the population being attacked and the means, methods, re-
sources and result of the attack.9 7 In addition, "patterns of crimes," or
"the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular
basis," are "a common expression of such systematic occurrence."98
Moreover, the tribunals have explained that the "concept of 'system-
atic' attack. . .refers to a deliberate pattern of conduct, but does not
necessarily include the idea of a plan."99 This position was reiterated
by the ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Muhimana where it held
that "[tihe existence of a policy or plan may be relevant in establishing
if an attack was directed at a civilian population or was widespread or
systematic, but its existence was not a distinct legal element of a crime
against humanity."100
As the ICTY has explained the desire to exclude isolated or ran-
dom acts from the notion of crimes against humanity is what led to the
inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be accompanied by "ei-
ther a finding of widespreadness. . .or systematicity. . .." 101 The
Appeals Chamber in the Tadia has identified four factors to consider
in establishing the systematic nature or character of an attack.102
First, the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which
the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word,
that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a community. Second, the per-
petration of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of
civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts
linked to one another. A third factor relates to the preparation and use
of significant public or private resources, whether military or other, in
furthering the plan. And the fourth factor is the implication of high-
level political and/or military authorities in the definition and estab-
lishment of the methodical plan.103
These factors have been examined in a number of cases. In
Kunarac the ICTY found that the involvement of the defendants in the
"systematic attack against Muslim civilians" satisfied the political ob-
97. Id., at I 430.
98. Id.
99. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgment, 329 (May 15,
2003) [hereinafter Semanza Trial Judgment], Prosecutor v. Tadiae, Case No IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment, 1 648 (May 7, 1997) (MacDonald, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Tadise
Trial Judgment].
100. Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T (April 28, 2005) [hereinafter
Muhimana, Trial Judgment] at 91 527.
101. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 1648 (May 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Tadic Trial Judgment].
102. Id.
103. Blaiki supra note 70, at 1 203.
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jective element. The defendants knew of the military conflict in the
region, had participated in it as soldiers, knew that one of the main
purposes of that campaign was to drive the Muslims out of the region,
and knew that one way to achieve that goal was to "terrorize the Mus-
lim civilian population."104 In addition, the defendants knew of the
"general pattern of crimes, especially of detaining women and girls in
different locations where they would be raped." 05 Likewise, the defen-
dant in Prosecutor v. Blakim,100 was found guilty of crimes against
humanity for his participation in a plan to destroy Bosnian Muslims in
the Laiva Valley region of central Bosnia. The plan involved the killing
of civilians regardless of age or gender, the destruction of private prop-
erty, and damage to mosques. General Blagkiae knowingly took part in
the implementation of the ideology, policy or plan. In order to achieve
his political objectives, Blaikim used all the military forces he could
enlist. Even knowing that some of the forces had committed crimes, he
still redeployed them for other attacks.107 Through these methods, he
forced the departure of the majority of the Muslim population in Laiva.
To the defense argument that a crime against humanity must be com-
mitted as part of an official State policy and the accused must intend to
implement the official State policy,10s the Trial Chamber offered two
comments. First, an accused need not be identified with the ideology,
policy, or plan in whose name mass crimes were committed, nor even
that he or she supports it. It is enough that he has knowledge of a plan
even though he may not even support it. What is critical is his willing
performance and participation in the execution of the plan. Second,
that the plan can be implemented from any level within the State and
the Trial Chamber does not presume only the highest level of State
leaders can implement these plans. 0 9
3. The Attack must be Directed Against a Civilian Population
For an attack to rise to the level of a crime against humanity, it
must be directed against a civilian population 110 and, in the specific
104. Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 68, at 2.
105. Id.
106. Blagkiae supra note 70, at T 203.
107. Id. at T 753.
108. Id. at 197.
109. Id. at 205.
110. Factors to consider when determining whether the attack may have been directed
against civilians include:
a) the means and method used in the course of the attack;
b) the status of the victims, their number;
c) the discriminatory nature of the attack;
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context of the Rwanda Statute, the attack must have been carried out
with a discriminatory intent.I" However, the requirement that the at-
tack must be directed against a "civilian population" does not "mean
that the entire population of the geographical entity in which the at-
tack is taking place must have been subjected to that attack."112 In
Prosecutor v. Tadix,113 the ICTY Trial Chamber further clarified the
meaning of an attack against a civilian population. It observed that the
meaning of civilian population is not altered by those actively involved
in a resistance movement nor of those that are not considered civilians.
Patients in a hospital for example, either civilians or resistance fight-
ers who have laid down their arms, are considered victims of crimes
against humanity.114 The reference in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute to
'population' is not interpreted as meaning that the act must have been
directed against the entire population of a given State or territory, but
implied that the acts are of a collective nature.115 This has been inter-
preted to mean that the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic
basis. Systematic basis is described as being committed through a
preconceived plan or policy. Widespread requires that the acts be com-
mitted on a large scale directed towards a multiplicity of victims.116 A
single, isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it was
the product of a political system based on terror or persecution. 117
d) the nature of the crimes committed in its course;
e) the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking
force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary
requirements of the laws of war. See Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra n. 7 at
para. 91.
111. See ICTR Statute, art. 3. In Prosecutor v. Muhimana the Trial Chamber found the
defendant guilty of crimes against humanity, specifically for having committed acts of
genocide and rape against Tutsi refugees. While this group of refugees was singled out for
genocidal attacks, the accused took pains to instruct Hutu refugees to separate from the
Tutsi in order to escape from those attacks. See Muhimana, Trial Judgment, T 524-530. The
requirement of discriminatory intent has also found its way into the jurisprudence of the
ICTY even though it is not specifically mentioned in article 5 of the ICTY Statute. For
instance, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadia3 adopted the requirement of
discriminatory intent based on the conclusions in the Report of the Secretary-General, and
the Security Council's interpretation of Article 5 as referring to acts taken on a
discriminatory basis. See Report of the Secretary -General pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, U.N. Doc. S/25704, 48.
112. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 58 at 90.
113. Prosecutor v. Tadia, Case No IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997)
(MacDonald, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Tadia Trial Judgment].
114. Id. at 1 643.
115. Id. at 644.
116. Id. at 9 648.
117. Id. at 649.
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There is unanimity among the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals that in order to satisfy the requirement of targeting the civil-
ian population, the evidence must show that the attack was directed at
more than "a limited and randomly selected number of individuals."'"
For example, in the Fofana case, the SCSL Trial Chamber declared
that the targeting of a select group of civilians, such as the targeted
killing of a number of political opponents, does not meet the definition
of population.119 The ICTY Appeals Chamber declared that "the ex-
pression 'directed against' is an expression which 'specifies that in the
context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the pri-
mary object of the attack." 120 Factors to consider when determining
whether the attack may have been directed against civilians include,
"the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of
the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the
nature of the crimes committed in its course, the resistance to the as-
sailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force may be
said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary
requirements of the laws of war."121
Furthermore, the attack must not simply be directed against a
civilian population but that population must be the primary object of
the attack. In the Fofana case, the SCSL Trial Chamber found the de-
fendants not guilty of any crimes against humanity because the
prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ci-
vilian population was the primary object of the attack.12 2 Instead, the
evidence before the Trial Chamber showed that the attacks were di-
rected against the rebels that controlled villages and communities
throughout Sierra Leone. 123 However, the SCSL Appeals Chamber re-
versed the Trial Chamber's ruling but not without providing some
guidelines for determining when the principal target of an attack is the
civilian population.
In reversing the Trial Chamber, the SCSL Appeals Chamber
held that "the civilian population comprises all persons who are civil-
ians and the presence within the civilian population of individuals who
do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the popu-
118. Id. at 1 90.
119. Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 61, at T 85.
120. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, at 91.
121. Id.
122. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at 693.
123. Id. at 694.
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lation of its civilian character."124 Therefore, "the presence of
rebels.. .within the victims does not deprive the population of its civil-
ian character." However, when determining whether the civilian
population was the primary attack, the SCSL Appeals Chamber em-
phasized that "what must be primary is the civilian population as a
target and not the purpose or the objective of the attack."125 Thus,
while the objectives of the attacks orchestrated by the defendants in
the Fofana case might have been to target rebels and their supporters
and regain lost territory and democracy, what matters is whether a
civilian population was targeted in order to achieve these objectives.
The facts demonstrate that the CDF was responsible for killings and
other atrocities against unarmed civilians who they characterized and
designated as "rebel collaborators" that occurred when activities and
operations against the enemy forces were already over.126 The SCSL
Appeals Chamber held that "perceived or suspected collaborators...
are likewise part of a 'civilian population,"127 and that the murdered
civilians could not have been "collateral victims" of a "legitimate mili-
tary attack" because of the lack of military operations between the
CDF and the rebels at the time the attack was commissioned. 128 Thus,
in order for a prohibited act to rise to the level of a crime against hu-
manity the civilian population must be specifically targeted and not be
seen as mere collateral victims of a military attack. In addition, despite
the fact that the evidence proved the commission of murder resulting
from the intentional acts of the defendants, the SCSL Trial Chamber
still issued a finding of not guilty for the charge of murder as a crime
against humanity,129 because proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
attacks were primarily directed against civilians was lacking. 30 The
Fofana ruling demonstrates how the element, which requires that the
attack be directed against a civilian population, distinguishes the vio-
lation of murder as a crime against humanity from other murder
violations.
124. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, T 259 (May 28,
2008) [hereinafter Fofana Appeals Judgment].
125. Id. at 299.
126. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Sentencing Judgment, T 305 (May
28, 2008) [hereinafter Fofana Sentencing Judgment]. The CDF Trial Judgment also reveals
attacks were launched and carried out after the departure of the rebels. Fofana Trial
Judgment, supra note 55, at 441, 449, 539, 570, and 582.
127. Fofana Appeals Judgment, supra note 103, at 264.
128. Id. at 9 306.
129. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at 694, 752.
130. Id. at 1 693; Fofana Appeals Judgment, supra note 103, at 9 259.
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Furthermore, in the Sesay case, the SCSL Trial Chamber elabo-
rated that "persons accused of 'collaborating' with the government or
armed forces would only become legitimate military targets if they
were taking direct part in the hostilities."131 Additionally, "indirectly
supporting or failing to resist an attacking force is insufficient to con-
stitute" direct participation in the hostilities. 13 2 As demonstrated by
the case law of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, a crime against humanity
is distinguishable from an ordinary crime because the act must be part
of a broader attack that is directed against a civilian population.
The Requisite Mental State
The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals has
also addressed the requisite mental state for the commission of a crime
against humanity: the applicable mens rea and acteus rea and the con-
currence between these two elements.
4. The Actions taken by the Accused must be Part of the Attack
The requirement that the act of the accused must be part of the
attack is satisfied by the "commission of an act which, by its nature or
consequences, is objectively part of the attack."1 33 According to Article
6 of the SCSL Statute, "a person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime. . .shall be individually responsible for the
crime." 134 The acts of the accused need only be part of the attack and
do not have to satisfy the "widespread or systematic" element.135 In
addition, the acts of the accused "need not be committed in the midst of
that attack," as "a crime which is committed before or after the main
attack against the civilian population or away from it could still, if suf-
ficiently connected, be part of that attack."136 However, the crime
cannot be an "isolated act" that is so far removed from the attack that
"it cannot reasonably be said to have been part of the attack."
137
This element of a crime against humanity is not distinguishable
from ordinary crimes in that all crimes require this showing of actus
reus. As mentioned above, the defendants in Fofana were indicted on
131. Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 61, at 86.
132. Id.
133. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at [ 120.
134. SCSL Statute, supra note 51, at art. 6(1).
135. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, at 96.
136. Id. at T[ 100.
137. Id.
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several counts, including Count 1, murder as a crime against humanity
and Count 2, murder as a war crime prohibited by the Geneva Conven-
tions.138 While the SCSL Trial Chamber separately analyzed the law
with respect to both charges, the Chamber concluded that both charges
shared certain elements, including the actus reus element that the
death of the person was caused by an act or omission of the Accused.139
In addition, the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide also has an
actus reus element, which is essentially the existence of an agreement
between individuals to commit genocide. 140
5. The accused must have knowledge of the directed attack
What interpretation have international criminal tribunals
given to the standard of mens rea required for crimes against humanity
under their various legal instruments? Should the mens rea required of
the accused be limited solely to an intention on his part to implement
the official State policy?14 1 Or, is that element satisfied if the accused
is aware of "the general context within which his act is framed at the
instant that he commits the crime?" These questions were addressed
by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Blagkij.1 42 The defendant in this case,
General Tihomir Blagkie, was indicted on three counts of crimes
against humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. The prosecution
alleged that he committed violations of international humanitarian
law against Bosnian Muslims by members of the Croatian Defense
Council ('HVO'), in the Laiva Valley of Central Bosnia, between May
1992 and January 1994. More importantly, as commander of the HVO
forces during this period of time, Blaikim was accused of having aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of each of the
alleged crimes. It was also alleged that he knew or had reason to know
that his subordinates had committed or were going to commit those
crimes and he willingly took no action to prevent their commission or
to punish those responsible. In finding that General Tihomir Blagkiae's
actions satisfied the mens rea element, the Trial Chamber explained
thus: the mens rea to a crime against humanity requires that the indi-
vidual knowingly take the risk of participating in the implementation
of the ideology, policy, or plan.143 It does not require that the agent be
138. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at IT 141, 145. See also SCSL Statute,
supra note 51 at arts. 2(a), 3(a).
139. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at $ 143, 146.
140. Bagosora Trial Judgment, supra note 74, at 1 2087.
141. Blaikix Trial Judgment, 1 197.
142. Id
143. Id. 91 257.
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identified with the ideology, policy, or plan in whose name mass crimes
were committed, nor even that he or she supports it. A person who has
knowledge of a plan may not even support it, but through his willing
performance and participation in the execution of the plan meets the
mens rea requirements nonetheless.
In Prosecutor v. Blakim the Tribunal found ample proof of the
accused's mental state as it was established that General Blagkie
knew that his HVO forces were killing civilians helter-skelter, destroy-
ing private property, and damaging mosques in a planned campaign to
eliminate the Muslim population. With his knowledge, the HOV forces
also arrested civilians and transferred them to detention centers. Gen-
eral Blaikiae himself confirmed that during this military operation
over twenty villages were attacked according to a pattern that was not
changed. 144
In a similar vein the ICTR Appeals Chamber tackled the requi-
site culpable state in a crime against humanity in Bagosora where it
observed that on the issue of the mens rea element "the perpetrator
must have acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack,
and with knowledge that his acts (or omissions) formed part of the
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population."145 In
language no different from that employed in Prosecutor v. Blagkix, the
Bagosora Trial Chamber explained the level of knowledge the accused
is held to: the accused must know, or have reason to know, that there is
an attack on the civilian population and that his acts comprise part of
that attack. It is irrelevant "whether the accused intended his acts to
be directed against the targeted population or merely against his vic-
tim," because "it is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must
be directed against the target population."146 The accused only has to
have knowledge that his acts were part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population. 147 Furthermore, the accused "needs to
understand the overall context in which his acts took place, but need
not know the details of the attack or share the purpose or goal behind
the attack."148 The SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Fofana case found
that the perpetrators did have knowledge that a widespread or system-
atic attack against the civilian population due to the evidence that the
CDF constructed and issued orders to carry out a policy to kill per-
144. Id. T 750-51.
145. Bagosora v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Appeals Judgment, a 389 (Dec. 14,
2011) [hereinafter Bagosora Appeals Judgment].
146. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, at 103.
147. Id. at 103.
148. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at T 121.
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ceived "collaborators" in order to "break any possible resistance or
collaboration by the population." 1 4 9
The Tribunals are split regarding whether the mens rea ele-
ment must include a showing of discriminatory intent. In order to meet
the definition of crimes against humanity, the ICTR requires the crime
to have "been committed on national, political, ethical, racial or relig-
ious grounds."150 Like the ICTY's addition of the "armed conflict
requirement," this ICTR requirement "allows the Tribunal to exercise
jurisdiction only over a restricted category of crimes."151 The ICTY and
SCSL on the other hand do not require a discriminatory intent in order
to find that a crime against humanity has been committed. In Prosecu-
tion v. Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that "the Trial Chamber
erred in finding that all crimes against humanity require a discrimina-
tory intent" and that "such an intent is an indispensable legal
ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for which this
is expressly required."152 The court further explains that the only
crime against humanity charge that would require discriminatory in-
tent is the crime of persecution.15a In the SCSL, one of the defendants
in Fofana argued that to establish that an attack was directed against
a civilian population, the prosecution carries the burden of establishing
that the civilians were targeted because of one of their distinguishable
characteristics.15 4 However, the SCSL Appeals Chamber rejected this
argument, citing with approval the ruling of the ICTY in Tadic. 155 The
Fofana opinion further explained that while several cases involved
groups of civilians being targeted based on their nationality, race,
ethnicity, or political affiliation, such a discriminatory intent behind
the attack is not a requirement for all crimes against humanity.156
It would appear that the mens rea element is not a distinguish-
ing element just as the actus reus element, since ordinary crimes also
require a certain level of knowledge or intent on the part of the accused
in order to be found guilty of a crime. For example, while analyzing the
legal elements of murder as a crime against humanity and murder as a
war crime, the SCSL in the Fofana case held that both require an ele-
ment of intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm, or reasonably
149. Fofana Appeals Judgment, supra note 103, at 318-19.
150. ICTR Statute, supra note 51, at art. 3.
151. Gacumbitsi Trial Judgment, supra note 56, at 1 301.
152. Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 64, at 9 305.
153. Id. at 305.
154. Fofana Appeals Judgment, supra note 103, at 9 262.
155. Id. at 1 263.
156. Id.
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knowing such would be the result. 15 7 While the mens rea of an accused
charged with a war crime must encompass "the fact that the victim
was a person not taking direct part in the hostilities," both war crimes
and crimes against humanity share the requisite knowledge that the
accused must possess when committing the crime.158 In the section
that follows, it will be argued that the elements described as the requi-
site mental state in the commission of a crime against humanity are
also present in the crime of indigenous spoliation.
IV. INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY?
A. Indigenous Spoliation: A New Form of Corruption
1. Corruption is No Synonym for Indigenous Spoliation
Textbook writers treat the spoliation of national wealth as
something akin to aggravated bribery. This, however, is not the case
with the modern version of corruption which is fundamentally different
from its historical antecedents as I have tried to argue in my previous
writings. 159 First, unlike past depredations where the wealth remained
in the territory for recycling, the modern context of state theft is char-
acterized by "great mobility of wealth and the capacity to hide and
disguise it." Most analysts agree that the outflows of illicit wealth
originating from Africa tend to be permanent, between 80-90 per cent
of which remain outside the Continent. 160 The bulk of the estimated
$10-$30 billion fortune of the late President of the Philippines, Ferdi-
nand Marcos, was stashed in about 7,270 gold accounts under different
names scattered across several Swiss banks 61 . Over 100 banks around
157. Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 55, at l1 143, 146.
158. Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 61, at 105.
159. See generally, Ndiva Kofele-Kale, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
EcoNoMic CRIMES: HOLDING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS OF
FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT 2d ed. (2006); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The
International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 45-118
(Jan. 1995); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Corruption and Indigenous Spoliation, 12 LAw & Bus. REV.
OF THE AMERICAS, 459-471 (Fall 2006); and Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Guarding the Guardians: A
Festchrift for Roberto MacLean, in LAW, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A LIBER
AmICORUM FOR PROFESSOR ROBERTO MACLEAN, CBE, 173-179 (Joseph J. Norton and Paul C.
Rogers, eds. 2007).
160. Raymond Baker, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., Testimony before the
U.K. Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, London, Thursday, January 19, 2006.
161. See generally Ndiva Kofele Kale, Economic Crimes and International Justice:
Elevating Corruption to the Status of a Crime in Positive International Law, CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (June 25, 2009), http://www.chrda.orglarticles4.
html accessed on Feb. 11, 2014.
35
36 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1:1
the world were involved in the handling of General Abacha'sl 62 stolen
wealth including Citigroup, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Stan-
dard Chartered and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell.163 With so many
numbered and unnumbered accounts, efforts at detecting and tracing
the whereabouts of stolen national assets usually end up becoming a
game of hide-and-seek! Where these assets can be traced, the sheer
volume of transactions can seriously impede the degree to which the
majority of victim States can aggressively mount successful recovery
and repatriation efforts.164
Second, the evidence is overwhelming that the bulk of stolen
national assets are never reinvested in productive enterprises in their
countries of origin. Predators prefer to invest their stolen wealth in
other places to avoid detection and subsequent recovery. For instance,
the late President Omar Bongo's preferred investment havens appear
to have been Senegal and Morocco: he held shares (ranging between 5
and 30 per cent) in 20 companies based in that country; he owned over
5,270 hectares of prime real estate in various regions of Senegal; a 90-
bed hotel in Casablanca and another in Marrakesh (60-bed), a 48-bed
Parisian hotel and a 50-bed hotel in Switzerland; he also owned build-
ings in France and the United States in addition to those in Senegal.
162. The late Sani Abacha was military ruler of Nigeria from 1993 to 1998. On his death
in 1998 Abacha left behind a fortune estimated anywhere between $2 and $5 billion, all of
which fleeced from the Nigerian people! See Transparency International, "Where did the
money go?-The top 10," www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/20004Available
Available at www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/20004 (last viewed June 13, 2009).
During the period he was Head of State, the Nigerian Central Bank had a standing order
instruction to transfer $15 million to Abacha's Swiss bank accounts every day. See RAYMOND
BAKER, CAPITALISM's ACHILLEs' HEEL 170, 172 (2005) (hereinafter "Baker").
163. Baker, supra note 148.
164. As the U.K. Financial Services Authority discovered in the course of its
investigations in tracking stolen assets, it takes longer to launch an investigation and track
assets in order to be at the stage of freezing those assets than it does for an accountant or
banker to move those assets elsewhere. See U.K. AFRICA ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP,
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: THE U.K. AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 45 (2008). After years of
litigation and with the cooperation of several foreign governments, the Nigerian
Government was able to recover part of the $3-$5 billion General Abacha, his family and
close associates, stole from the Nigerian people. Much of the $2.2 billion the Government
attempted to recover has been frozen or repatriated to Nigeria:
* Voluntary returns made by the Abacha family: $750 million
* Funds paid in settlement of claims against Bagadu, Abacha's "right hand man":
$150 million
* Repatriated from Switzerland, following supreme court proceedings: $600 million
* Monies frozen in Lichtenstein, Luxembourg and Jersey: $750 million
* Further monies to be remitted from Switzerland, pending outcome of court cases:
$70 million
* Sums frozen in British banks: $40 million.
See Letter from Kendall Freeman Solicitors dated 10/02/06 to the All Africa Parliamentary
Group quoted in The Other Side of the Coin, id.
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A third feature of the modern indigenous spoliation is the quan-
tum of assets involved. It is estimated that Africa's political elite hold
somewhere between $700 and $800 billion in offshore accounts outside
the Continent, 1 65 an amount which dwarfs the $54 billion World Bank
aid flows to Africa over the past four decades.166 Most decent people
would find these excesses not only revolting but as one commentator
was moved to admit, going beyond shame and almost beyond
imagination.167
These private portfolios of looted assets stashed abroad are usu-
ally so large in relation to the total external debts of the countries from
which the funds were stolen. In some cases private wealth even ex-
ceeds a country's total foreign debt. For instance, capital flight from
Sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at $274 billion (including interest earn-
ings), was equivalent to 145 per cent of the total debt owed by these
countries in the mid-1990s. 168 By the Nigerian Government's own ac-
count, that nation's total external indebtedness in 2004 stood at $28
billion which is approximately 28 per cent of the $100 billion of na-
tional funds in private hands.169 Africa loses an estimated $148 billion
annually through acts of corruption, an amount which represents 25
per cent of the continent's Gross Domestic Product!170
Worse yet, some of these looted funds account for a significant
share of the victim country's annual GDP; Ferdinand Marcos of the
165. David Murray, Transparency International, U.K., Testimony before the U.K. All
Africa Party Parliamentary Group, London, Thursday, Dec. 8, 2005.
166. Shaukat Hassan, Corruption and the Development Challenge, 1 J. DEV. POL'Y &
PRACTICE 32, 39 (2004).
167. See DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT
CRISIS 60 (1984). See APPENDIX.
168. James Boyle and Leonce Ndikumana, Africa's Debt: Who Owes Whom? in CAPITAL
FLIGHT AND CAPITAL CONTROLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (GERALD A. EPSTEIN, ED. 2005).
The comparable amount for the Middle East and North Africa is $526 billion. See ABDULLAH
ALMOUNSOR, A DEVELOPMENT COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO CAPITAL FLIGHT: THE CASE OF THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1970-2002 (2005).
169. See Press Release GA/EF/3002, Fifty-seventh General Assembly Second Committee
10th Meeting (AM)(Statement by O.A. Ashiru, Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the
Second Committee (Economic and Financial) of the United Nations General Assembly. In
the same vein, the National Economic and Financial Crimes Commission estimates that
between 1960, when Nigeria obtained its independence from Britain, and 1999, as much as
$440 billion was stolen or misused by the country's past rulers. This figure is equivalent to
the amount of international aid given to the entire African continent in four decades. See
David Blair, £220bn stolen by Nigeria's corrupt rulers, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 25, 2005,
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news (last accessed on 09.08.05 at http://news.telegraph.co.uk/
news) cited in The Other Side of the Coin, supra note 142, at 14 (last viewed on Sept. 8,
2002).
170. Id.; see also Princewill Ekwujuru, Corruption Is Bleeding Africa Dry!, available at
www.asconline.org (last viewed June 13, 2009).
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Philippines is alleged to have stolen between 1.5 and 4.5 percent of his
nation's annual GDP, while General Abacha's estimated net worth rep-
resented between 1.5 and 3.7 percent of Nigeria's GDP.171
Fourth, those most implicated in the systematic plunder of na-
tional wealth come from a particular class of people who hold public
trust: heads of state and government as well as other high ranking
constitutionally elected and appointed leaders; their families and clos-
est friends (see Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to revelations following the
Arab Spring, we are now learn that the recently ousted Egyptian dicta-
tor, Hosni Mubarak, may be richer than Bill Gates, founder of
Microsoft or the Mexican business tycoon, Carlos Slim, who with a net
worth of $54 billion is reputed to be the world's richest man! Reliable
sources place the wealth of Mubarak and his family at somewhere be-
tween $40 and $70 billion. How did a former military officer, turned
civilian President, whose official monthly salary as head of state,
counting benefits, totaled 4,750 Egyptian Y($808) in 2007 and 2008,
amass so much wealth?
a. Prise de Conscience
The realization that the leaders of the developing world were
fully implicated in the theft of their national wealth came rather late
for many Third World scholars, especially those who had been spoon-
fed the dependicia menu on the causes of Third World underdevelop-
ment.172 Many believed that giant multinational companies like Shell-
171. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, COMBATING ECONOMIC CRIMES: BALANCING COMPETING
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN PROSECUTING THE CRIME OF ILLICIT ENRICHMENT 4 (2011).
172. Perhaps a bit of historical background for context and perspective is necessary to
track the metamorphosis in my own intellectual development on this problem of indigenous
spoliation. I studied and taught political science in the United States in the radical 60's and
70's and I quite naturally belonged to that generation of Third World scholars who came
under the spell of the 'dependencia' school, popularized in the writings of Andre Gunder
Frank, Walter Rodney, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Immanuel
Wallerstein. Converts to this school were of the firm conviction that the major obstacle to
the development of the developing world was the stranglehold Euro-American capitalist/
imperialist interests had on them. We believed that the underdevelopment of developing
countries far from being an original or 'natural' state was rather a condition imposed by the
international expansion of capitalism. The 'dependencia' school aptly referred to this
phenomenon as "the development of underdevelopment." Consistent with this paradigm,
giant multinational corporations such as Firestone in Liberia, Del Monte in Central
America, Shell-BP in English-speaking Africa and Elf-Total in French-speaking Africa were
presented as the vehicles for this global expansion of capitalism. On their part, these
behemoths, who paid allegiance to no particular nation but only to their shareholders in
Europe and North America, sought to present themselves as forces for good. But in the
zeitgeist of that period, multinationals were painful reminders of Virgil's warning to the
people of Troy to never trust the horse and to beware of the Greeks even when they came
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BP, Firestone, and Del Monte were responsible for the theft of enor-
mous wealth and resources found in the developing world, siphoning
its scarce capital for transfer to Europe and America. Thanks to the
unrestrained flight of capital while the West advanced economically,
most of the developing countries found themselves sliding backwards
decades after achieving sovereignty. Rather simplistically, it was
thought that in order to escape from their 'underdevelopment' all that
was needed was for these states to take control of their natural re-
sources and wealth. To do that, would require 'taming' the
multinationals, so to speak, through outright expropriation, nationali-
zation, joint ventures, and other forms of partnerships permitting
locals to gain a significant foothold in these enterprises. Help came
from the United Nations General Assembly in the form of the now fa-
mous Resolution 1803, proclaiming the inalienable right of all people
and nations to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural re-
sources and wealth.173 This Resolution was followed twelve years later
with the adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
Economic Order1 74 (NIEO) and the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States.175
However, as the euphoria that initially greeted the arrival of
these NIEO instruments began to wane, the balance sheet continued to
show that nothing much had changed in the nature of Third World
underdevelopment: the financial hemorrhage continued unabated as
huge amounts of capital continued to flee its shores for more salubrious
safe havens in Europe and North America. As we have already pointed
out, Africa loses, conservatively, $148 billion annually, roughly 25 per
cent of the continent's GDP, through licit and illicit capital flight.
Clearly we had missed something and had to go back to the drawing
board. It would appear that in our singular focus on exogenous spolia-
tion we had completely ignored a far more insidious form of illegal
appropriation of the wealth and resources of developing countries, one
bearing fruits! Multinationals like Trojan horses were not to be trusted because in the end
they placed the interests of their shareholders over those of the nation.
173. Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 14 December 1962. GA Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, UN Doc. A/5217 (1963).
174. Adopted by the UN general Assembly, 1 May 1974. GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6
(Special), UN GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess. Supp. No. 1, at 3, UN Doc. A/9559 (1974); See also
PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.
Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 1 May 1974. GA Res. 3202, UN GAOR, 6th Special
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, UN Doc. A/9559.
175. Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1974. GA Res. 3281, UN
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, UN Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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organized and meticulously executed by Third World leaders
themselves!
b. The Nexus Between Acts of Indigenous Spoliation and Acts
Constituting Crimes Against Humanity
Can a reasonable case be made that acts of indigenous spolia-
tion satisfy the criteria generally identified as characterizing crimes
under international law, i.e., acts of such serious nature that are wide-
spread or systematic, directed against the civilian population with
effects that strike at the very foundations of the victim states? It is to
this question that we now turn our attention. There are three bases
under which indigenous spoliation can be treated as a crime under pos-
itive international law. First, it is important to point out that the list of
crimes recognized in the Draft Code of Crimes, and, in particular, those
prohibited acts identified as constituting crimes against humanity,
were never intended to be exhaustive. The ILC acknowledged that the
enumeration of crimes in the draft code could subsequently be supple-
mented by new instruments of the same legal nature. This has left
open the possibility that with the progressive evolution of international
law other crimes could be added to this list.176 In line with this think-
ing, a cursory review of the drafting history of the Draft Code of Crimes
reveals that the list of crimes has expanded and collapsed with differ-
ent versions of the draft code. The 1991 version included inter alia
terrorism, mercenarism, environmental pollution as possible crimes
against humanity. They were subsequently dropped in the final ver-
sion that was adopted by the United Nations in 1996. The list of crimes
against humanity is a work in progress, constantly adapting to a
changing international landscape. As world conscience evolves other
inhumane acts that meet the general definition of crimes against hu-
manity will surely be added to this list.
A second basis for including indigenous spoliation as a crime
under international law is provided for by the Statutes of the various
United Nations ad hoc Tribunals as well as the Draft Code of Crimes.
All these instruments seem to anticipate this eventuality by including
in their definition of crimes against humanity, a category of "other hu-
mane acts" as a catchall for acts which cause the same harmful results
as the acts listed in the main definition.' 77 Furthermore, the act of "ex-
176. Since these lists were only intended to be illustrative, not exclusionary, the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction does not apply to bar the addition
of indigenous spoliation as a prohibited act.
177. See ICTY Statute, art. 5; ICTR Statute, art. 3; and SCSL Statute, art. 2.
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termination" which is one of the acts that qualify as a crime against
humanity includes in its definition the intentional infliction of condi-
tions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine,
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. It
would be quite easy to expand the list of enumerated acts under
"crimes against humanity" to include acts of indigenous spoliation
which like extermination also bring about the destruction of a civilian
population. Understandably, justifying this addition would require
compelling evidence of how indigenous spoliation constitutes a serious
violation of certain fundamental human rights.
Finally, the central test for a crime against humanity is that the
acts are sufficiently serious, systematic or widespread, and directed
against the civilian population. The review of the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc international criminal tribunals strongly suggest that the
"widespread or systematic" requirement is considered the most widely
accepted international criterion for distinguishing crimes against hu-
manity from common crimes, which do not rise to the level of crimes
under international law.1 78 Much like the Draft Code, the most recent
international instruments use the "widespread or systematic" formula-
tion in defining crimes against humanity179(the requirement is usually
framed in the disjunctive).18 oThe formulation also reflects state prac-
tice as evidenced in judicial decisions. On the first prong, i.e.,
"widespread or systematic acts", the jurisprudence of both the Yugosla-
via and Rwanda Tribunals have adopted an expansive definition of
"systematic" as referring to the organized nature of the acts and the
improbability of their random occurrence. The jurisprudence of these
courts also makes clear that patterns of crimes, in the sense of the
non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular ba-
sis, are a common expression of such systematic occurrence. It remains
178. This international element has been traced to an analysis of the Legal Committee
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, which used the two alternatives both as a
single cumulative internationalizing element and disjunctively: "". . .". . . As a rule
systematic mass action, particularly if it was authoritative, was necessary to transform a
common crime, punishable only under municipal law, into a crime against humanity, which
thus became also the concern of international law. Only crimes which either by their
magnitude and savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was
applied at different times and places, endangered the international community or shocked
the conscience of mankind warranted intervention by State other than on whose territory the
crimes had been committed, or whose subjects had become their victims." See History of the
United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, 179
(1948) cited in Dixon and Hall, supra note 34, at 177.
179. See Rome Statute, art. 5; Sierra Leone Statute, art. 2; Cambodia Extraordinary
Chambers Law, art. 5.
180. See Draft Code of Crimes, art. 18, 1 Y.B. ILC 47 (1996).
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unclear, however, when an act satisfies the widespread part of the re-
quirement. It has been suggested that such a determination should be
made on the basis of the quantum of victims involved and the severity
of the damage inflicted. Although this requirement was not expressly
included in article 5 of the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, it has
nonetheless been incorporated in its jurisprudence.
In addition to the "widespread or systematic" requirement, the
common factor in all the acts that constitute crimes against humanity
is the serious violation of certain fundamental human rights. But seri-
ousness, recognized as the basic concept underlying the entire draft
code, does not necessarily mean harmful to human life in a direct sense
as an attack on bodily integrity. Rather, an act may be-and has in-
deed been-characterized as sufficiently grave for the purposes of the
Draft Code if its direct effect or its long-term repercussions undermine
the substantive bases of life in conditions of good health and individual
and collective dignity. Grave and severe damage to the foundations of
the socio-economic foundations of the state meets these criteria. Al-
though such damage, by definition, does not immediately and directly
destroy human life, its long-term effects may lead to that result.
These elements make sense when it is understood that the tar-
get of a crime against humanity is the civilian population. It is against
this group that the seriousness or the systematic effects of the crime
can be measured. As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the
Kunarac case:
The use of the word "population" does not mean that the entire popu-
lation of the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place
must have been subjected to that attack. It is sufficient to show that
enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that
they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy the Chamber that the
attack was in fact directed against a civilian "population", rather
than against a limited and randomly selected number of
individuals. 18
The examples of illegal acts of depredation detailed in Part IV of
this Article illustrate the widespread and systemic damage to human
society caused by acts of indigenous spoliation and the disastrous con-
sequences this activity might entail for the civilian population of the
victim State.182 These illegal acts are committed by individuals who
181. Id.; Prosecutor v Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber,
12 June 2002, 1 90 (footnotes omitted).
182. See generally UNDP PRACTICE NOTE: ANTi-CORRUPTION FINAL VERSION FEBRUARY
2004, 2.2, 3-4; see also United Nations OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE GLOBAL
PROGRAMME AGAINST CORRUPTION: UN ANTi-CORRuPTION ToOLKIT, 3rd ed. (September 2006)
and UNDP Discussion Paper, Corruption and Good Governance, available at http:/ /magnet
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have been placed in positions of trust as public official who instead use
their knowledge and privileged access to state resources for personal
gain or motive. The term "attack" as an element in the crime against
humanity is generally understood as an unlawful act which is directed
against a civilian population. Crimes against humanity do not require
a specific mens rea as the case law of the international tribunals
teaches. The mens rea to a crime against humanity only requires that
the accused knowingly took the risk of participating in the implemen-
tation of a policy or plan and that he acted with full knowledge of the
broader context within which his actions took place. There is no ques-
tion that a public servant, like a head of state or a government
minister who systematically siphons substantial amounts of funds
from the public treasury for his private use, is fully aware of the wider
ramifications of his actions on society and the civilian population he is
called to serve. It is enough for a crime against humanity to have oc-
curred if the prohibited acts were directed at just a fraction of the
civilian population. Here, the acts of indigenous spoliation target the
entire population of a given State since they attack the very founda-
tions of the society. Few ever escape the effects of acts of indigenous
spoliation inasmuch as they are committed on a large scale and di-
rected towards a multiplicity of victims. Box 2 captures the widespread
and systematic effects of acts of indigenous spoliation of a single public
servant for a brief period in the life of a country. In a five year period,
the Director-General of a state fund meant for local councils trans-
ferred anywhere between $57 million and $101 million to his or his
close associates' private accounts. It would be worthwhile to put this
theft of public funds in its Cameroonian context.
>> The annual budget for the Douala City Council, one of the stat-
utory beneficiaries of the local council funds, a city with a
population of over two million people and Cameroon's economic
capital, is a paltry $18 million, about one fifth the amount sto-
len by this public servant.
>> For the 2006-2007 fiscal years, the budget for the Ministry of
Public Health stood at 105 billion FCFA (about $210 million).
The money embezzled from the state by this public official and
his close associates could have covered about twenty per cent of
the national health care bill for one year!
>> The Bertoua - Garoua-Boulai highway (248 km), a major high-
way linking two of Cameroon's ten regions, was completed in
2002 at a cost of 2.5 billion FCFA. The 29 billion FCFA of state
funds diverted into this public official's private accounts were
.undp.org/Docslefalcorruption3/corruption3.htm; available at http://magnet.undp.org/
Docs/efa/corruption3/corruption3.htm; see also Philip M. Nichols, The Psychic Costs of
Violating Corruption Laws, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145 (2012).
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more than enough to construct an additional 2,976 km network
of roads.
>> During the period the local councils account was being fleeced
by its Director-General, officials at the University of Buea, one
of only two English-speaking universities in Cameroon, were
unable to raise the 400 million FCFA (roughly $800,000)
needed to effectively kick off the newly-created Faculty of
Medicine. University authorities were forced to search for pri-
vate donors to underwrite this project because the Government
of Cameroon announced that it could not afford the cost at the
time. However, funds just from the director-general's fictitious
"missions" could have constructed the basic infrastructure of at
least three medical schools in the country.
Finally, it is important to not forget that the funds diverted into
the personal accounts of these high ranking officials were tax payer
contributions intended for their local municipal councils for the devel-
opment of local infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, markets, etc.)
and basic municipal services (waste disposal, street lighting, health
and social services, literacy education and vocational training, etc.)
that would serve millions of people!
CONCLUSION
An argument could be made that acts of indigenous spoliation
as those described in this Article do not rise to the level of horrendous-
ness as the other established prohibited acts that comprise the crime
against humanity. That notwithstanding, it is submitted that the key
elements identified in legal instruments amounting to the commission
of a crime against humanity would be met based on the jurisprudence
reviewed above.
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Appendix
BOX 1: DISPATCH FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR TO CAMEROON AS DISCLOSED BY
WIKILEAKS (UNEDITED)
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 000587
SIPDIS
STATE ALSO FOR INIJC AND AF/C DS/IP/AF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: KCOR EAIR CVIS CM
SUBJECT: ASTOUNDING CORRUPTION AT CAMEROON'S AIRPORT AGENCY
Classified By: Political Officer Tad Brown for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (U) This message contains an action request for INLC.
2. (C) Summary: Roger Ntongo Onguene, the General Manager of Aeroports du Cameroun (ADC),
the Cameroonian government agency charged with management of the nation's airports, has
embezzled millions of dollars from the ADC's coffers, undercut the agency's effectiveness and
engaged in ethnically-biased hiring practices, according to a document given to the Embassy by
Amadou Ali, Cameroon's Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. Ntongo has been rumored to
be among the next tranche of public officials to be fired in the Government of Cameroon's (GRC)
anti-corruption campaign dubbed "Operation Sparrowhark" by the media, but has not yet been
removed from his position. Even in the context of a government rife with malfeasance, Ntongo's
corruption is breathtaking in its scope and brashness. End summary.
Corruption;A Full-Time Job
3. (C) In a May meeting with Poloff, Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Justice Amadou Ali,
who has been at the leading edge of the GRC's anti-corruption law enforcement efforts, shared a
two page document, apparently the summary of an investigation or audit, listing examples of
Ntongo's corruption and mismanagement. Among some of the more remarkable allegations:
-for 4 years, Ntongo leased his personal vehicle (a 4-year old Toyota Camry) to the ADC for a
daily fee of about $600; in 2007, he then sold the vehicle to the ADC for about $100,000; in 2005,
he leased a truck to the ADC for three months at a cost of $45,000
-contrary to GRC regulations, the ADC paid more than $200,000 to cover two years of Ntongo's
son's university fees in the UK-
-a 4WD vehicle purchased for $120,000 for the Chairman of the ADC Board was given instead to
the Mayor of Obala, Ntongo's hometown; the ADC continued to pay fuel and maintenance fees for
the vehicle;
-the ADC paid about $60,000 to pave the road leading to Ntongo's private residence;
-Ntongo terminated contracts with two companies who cleaned the airports under ADC; Ntongo
then hired three companies that he owned, at contracts paying four times the previous rates (at
monthly rates of about $65,000); the equipment used by these two companies was purchased by the
ADC for about $700,000;
-of the personnel hired to ADC by Ntongo, 90% come from his native Lekie Distract;
The Costs of This Corruption
4. (SBU) Although Central African Economic Community (CEMAC) regulations that were
incorporated into Cameroonian law through a Presidential Decree make it illegal for anybody to
have a monopoly in the aviation sector, ADC has enjoyed a monopolistic position in Cameroon,
where airlines are obliged to pay ADC fees even for services that are not needed or never provided.
According to a well-placed industry source, the ADC's fees are among the highest in the world,
second only to Tokyo's, and with no value added; airlines are forced to hire sub-contractors to do
the handling that ADC is paid to do. These exorbitant fees were factors in the recent failure of
domestic airlines NACAM and Elysian Airlines and national flag carrier CAMAIR. There is
currently no domestic air service in Cameroon, with CAMAIR formally closed and undergoing
liquidation.
Comment: What Does it Take to Get Fired?
5. (C) Even in the Cameroonian context, where large-scale corruption is the norm, Ntongo's
brazen fleecing of the ADC is startling. The ADC's effective monopoly has stunted the aviation
sector in Cameroon and effectively killed Cameroon's domestic airlines. No amount of GRC
investment or training from the USG or any other donor could possibly overcome the paralyzing
effect of such intense corruption and mismanagement. Ntongo's case provides the evidence, if any
more were needed, that corruption is inextricably linked to Cameroon's development challenges.
The emergence of this document provides reason to believe that Ntongo will face justice, but the
GRC's decision to allow him to continue running the ADC provides insight into Biya's management
style and reason to question the rigor of his commitment to stamp out corruption in Cameroon.
End comment.
Action Request for INIC
6. (C) Post asks that INL/C place a p212f hit for Roger Ntongo Onguene (DOB 17-May-1959).
$28
